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CASENOTE
United States v. Martignon: The First Case to
Rule that the Federal Anti-Bootlegging
Statute Is Unconstitutional
Copyright Legislation
I. A FIRST LOOK AT UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON1
Jean Martignon owns and operates Midnight Records, a small
record business that includes a Manhattan retail store, a catalog service,
and an Internet site.2 Since 1978, Mr. Martignon primarily has sold
authorized recordings produced and distributed by record companies.3
However, Midnight Records also sells bootlegged albums and compact
discs ("CDs") consisting of live musical recordings never released by
their performers or their record labels.4 Consequently, these recordings
are not available in the traditional commercial market.5 In September of
2003, federal and state law enforcement agents arrested Martignon after
the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") initiated an
investigation into Midnight Records.6 Less than two months later, Jean
Martignon was indicted by a federal grand jury for selling unauthorized
recordings of live performances' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A8
("anti-bootlegging statute" or "§ 2319A"), a federal criminal statute
prohibiting bootlegging. Martignon subsequently moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that the anti-bootlegging statute is unconstitu-
tional.9 On September 24, 2004, Judge Harold Baer of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held § 2319A
unconstitutional for its circumvention of the fixation and duration limita-
1. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
2. Id. at 417.
3. Defendant Jean Martignon's Motion and Memorandum in Support Thereof to Dismiss the




6, Id. at 7.
7. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
9. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
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tions 10 of the Copyright Clause. I' Furthermore, the court held that
because § 2319A is copyright-like legislation,' 2 Congress may not jus-
tify the anti-bootlegging statute by evading Copyright Clause require-
ments and resorting to the separate grant of authority found in the
Commerce Clause. 13  Having declared § 2319A unconstitutional, the
court granted defendant Jean Martignon's motion to dismiss the
indictment. '4
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. A Brief History of Bootlegging
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined a bootlegged
phonorecord as one containing an "unauthorized copy of a commercially
unreleased performance."' 5 Sources of bootlegs include, but are not
limited to, recordings of live concerts, radio or television broadcasts, and
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis added)). While a duration limitation clearly exists due to
the "limited Times" language, a fixation requirement is not explicit in the text of the Copyright
Clause. However, the word "Writings" certainly connotes a degree of permanence in a work, and
a fixation requirement has been read into the Constitution via an interpretation of "Writings." See
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ...." (emphasis added)); H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (indicating that a
fixed work exists "if there has been an authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if
that embodiment 'is sufficiently permanent or stable' to permit the work 'to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."'); 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][2], at 1-66.30 (2005)
("If the word '[W]ritings' is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote
'some material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance."').
Although in the modem era the term "[W]ritings" has allowed Congress to extend copyright
protection to a great many things, they have always involved some fixed, tangible, and durable
form. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (holding that "Writings" may be
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor).
11. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423 ("Because the anti-bootlegging statute provides
seemingly perpetual protection for unfixed musical performances, it runs doubly afoul of
Congress' authority to regulate under the Copyright Clause.").
12. Id. at 422.
13. Id. at 425.
14. Id. at 429.
15. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 211 n.2 (1985). Bootlegs differ from the two
other principal forms of musical piracy: counterfeits and pirated recordings. Counterfeits are
defined as unauthorized copies of a legitimate album, designed to look like authorized copies.
David Schwartz, Note, Strange Fixation: Bootleg Sound Recordings Enjoy the Benefits of
Improving Technology, 47 FED. Comm. L.J. 611, 620 (1995); Todd D. Patterson, Comment, The
Uruguay Round's Anti-Bootlegging Provision: A Victory for Musical Artists and Record
Companies, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J. 371, 378-80 (1997). Piracy, on the other hand, simply refers to the
duplication of a sound recording that has already been commercially released. See Dowling, 473
U.S. at 209 n.2. This article is concerned solely with bootlegging.
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studio outtakes. 6 Music bootlegging can be traced back to the 1920s
and has encompassed all genres of music from opera and symphony to
jazz and rock. 17 However, it was the 1969 release of the Bob Dylan
bootleg entitled Great White Wonder," which spawned the modem
bootleg industry as we know it today.' 9 The release of Great White
Wonder "marked the first widely distributed and truly popular recording
of this kind. The success of this new bootleg demonstrated that it would
be possible to meet the public's demand for new music through the
unsanctioned release of live recordings . .. [and] proved that fans were
willing to pay top dollar ... ."Io Following the success of Great White
Wonder, bootleg releases of other musicians' recordings, including the
Beatles and the Rolling Stones, began to flourish.2"
In the early stages of the modem bootlegging industry, quality con-
trol proved to be a major issue,22 as the sound quality of studio record-
ings was far superior to bootlegged copies on vinyl.23 However, the
advent of cassette tapes soon made the production and distribution of
bootlegs increasingly easy, serving to foreshadow the impact that tech-
nology would have on the underground bootlegging industry.24 In the
two decades that followed the release of Great White Wonder, further
advances in technology ultimately culminated in the 1990s being dubbed
the "Golden Age of boots."25 For example, the advent of CDs and DAT
16. Patterson, supra note 15, at 374; Dawn R. Maynor, Just Let the Music Play: How Classic
Bootlegging Can Buoy the Drowning Music Industry, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 173, 175 (2002).
17. Greg M. Daugherty, The Economics of Bootlegging, http://members.tripod.com/
-serenitymag/02/bootleg.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005); Hank Hoffman, Boot-Buyers Beware,
NEW HAVEN ADVOC., June 5, 1997, at 22.
18. Great White Wonder included cuts from home recording sessions in Minneapolis in 1961
and Woodstock in 1967. CLINTON HEYLIN, BOOTLEG: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE OTHER
RECORDING INDUSTRY 1 (1995); see also Patterson, supra note 15, at 371-72. Columbia Records
enjoyed commercial success years later when it authorized the release of the very same material
under the name "The Basement Tapes." Kurt Glemser, A Brief But Incomplete History of
Bootlegs, http://log.on.ca/hotwacks/zhist.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
19. See Patterson, supra note 15, at 371; Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22; Bootlegs Feature,
Part 1, A Potted History (Nov. 1999), http://www.moremusic.co.uk/links/features/bootleg.htm
[hereinafter Bootlegs Feature].
20. Patterson, supra note 15, at 371-72.
21. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22.
22. Id.
23. See HEYLIN, supra note 18, at 184.
24. See Bootlegs Feature, supra note 19.
25. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22.
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recorders26 not only brought bootlegs to the masses,27 but did so with
sound quality far superior to that of records or cassette tapes.2 8 Further-
more, internet technology led to an increase in "tape trading" 29 by pro-
viding an improved platform for this more informal means of
distribution.30
B. The Road to Federal Protection of Unrecorded Live Music
Federal copyright protection has existed for written musical compo-
sitions since 183131 and for sound recordings since 1971.32 However,
prior to 1994, such protection did not extend to unrecorded live perform-
ances. 33 When Congress did address this apparent gap in copyright pro-
tection by enacting § 2319A, it did so in response to developments
during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").34
By the late 1970s, the aforementioned advances in technology that
made counterfeiting cheaper and more profitable had led to "an explo-
sion in international trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods .. .
26. A Digital Audio Tape ("DAT") is a device that consists of a tape housed in a cassette.
However, because the sound is recorded digitally, DATs have audio quality equal to that of
compact discs, giving DAT technology the same superior audio quality that compact disc
technology utilizes. HEYLIN, supra note 18, at 242-47.
27. While still miniscule compared to the mainstream music industry, the bootlegging
industry became a multi-million dollar business. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22.
28. Patterson, supra note 15, at 376-77; see also Jerry D. Brown, U.S. Copyright Law After
GAT: Why a New Chapter Eleven Means Bankruptcy for Bootleggers, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1,
6 (1995).
29. Tape trading is an exchange of bootleg concert tapes or other unreleased material.
Serious fans engaged in tape trading long before bootlegs were commercially available. Patterson,
supra note 15, at 376-77.
30. See Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22.
31. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
32. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)). The Sound Recording Act amended Title 17 to include
sound recordings as a category of protected works "for the purpose of protecting against
unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings." Id.
33. Prohibitions on bootlegs did exist at the state level. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 77-
440, § 2, 1977 Fla. Laws 1802 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 540.11(2)(a)(3) (2004))
(criminalizing the unauthorized recording of performances, "whether live before an audience or
transmitted by wire or through the air by radio or television").
34. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
The anti-bootlegging statute (§ 2319A) that is the focus of this paper originated in section 513 of
the URAA, which was the domestic codification of GATT with respect to criminal penalties for
"[u]nauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical
performances." Id. "GATr is an international arrangement under which nearly eighty countries
have negotiated common norms for international trade .... When it was first organized shortly
after World War H, GATT focused primarily on promoting the reduction of tariff barriers to the
international movement of goods." Patterson, supra note 15, at 402. "The goal of GAT'T is to
find ways to encourage free trade among nations." Id.
35. Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era of Protection
[Vol. 60:131
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The United States and other developed countries concluded that the
absence of workable international protection mechanisms36 to combat
this illicit international traffic was negatively impacting international
trade.37 In response, the international community turned to GATT as a
basis for addressing intellectual property issues.
When the Uruguay Round of negotiations began in September of
1986, leaders identified "[t]rade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights, including trade in counterfeit goods," as a subject for negotia-
tion.3 9 After seven years of negotiation and debate, the Uruguay Round
concluded on December 15, 1993 with the adoption of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").4"
Signed by 111 nations,4' TRIPS incorporated the most productive com-
ponents of existing international copyright conventions,4" added a new
level of minimum rights and standards,4 3 and introduced a powerful
enforcement mechanism never before seen in international intellectual
property law." Professor Doris Long asserts that "[o]n a more funda-
mental level, TRIPS represents a new effort to improve copyright own-
ers' ability to protect their copyrightable works internationally . .. .""
Most significant for present purposes, the new protection under TRIPS
binds the signatory nations to providing complete protection for live per-
formances.4 6 In order to comply with TRIPS, and domestically imple-
or An Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 531, 535 (1994). As is fairly common, Long uses the
terms "counterfeits" and "piracy" interchangeably with "bootlegs". See id. However, as stated
earlier, bootlegs are distinguishable from counterfeits or pirates. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
36. Although other major international treaties such as the Berne and the U.C. Convention
provided non-discriminatory access to the legal systems of member nations, their lack of
mandatory enforcement procedures rendered them an incomplete solution to the bootlegging of
live performances. See Patterson, supra note 15, at 402.
37. Long, supra note 35, at 535.
38. Id.
39. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, in 3 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 1, 7-8 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993); Long, supra note 35, at
534.
40. Long, supra note 35, at. 533.
41. Id.
42. Patterson, supra note 15, at 404; see, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights arts. 2(2), 3(1), 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
43. Long, supra note 35, at 533.
44. Patterson, supra note 15, at 404.
45. Long, supra note 35, at 533. This additional protection comes from "not only agreed-
upon minimum levels of substantive rights in such works, but also minimum levels of
enforcement of these rights, including certain minimum procedural and remedial standards, under
the auspices of GATT dispute resolution mechanisms." Id.
46. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 42, art. 14(1), at 1202. Live performances had no
international copyright protection prior to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
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ment its mandatory protection standards, Congress enacted the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act ("URAA")47 on December 8, 1994.48
The URAA served as the "bridge between the new requirements of
the TRIPS Agreement and existing American copyright law."4 9 One
major change in domestic copyright law pursuant to the URAA's imple-
mentation of TRIPS was that, for the first time, federal protection
against the production and distribution of bootlegs was extended to live
performers.5 ° Up until that point, U.S. copyright law contained almost
no provisions protecting live performances, 5' as it was generally
accepted that this would contravene the requirement that a work be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression to be copyrightable.52 Section 513
of the URAA added § 2319A, the criminal anti-bootlegging statute,53 to
Title 18 of the United States Code, providing that anyone who,
without the consent of the performer or performers involved, know-
ingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain, fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical per-
formance in a copy or phonorecord .... [or] transmits or otherwise
communicates to the public the sounds or sounds and images of a live
musical performance .. .shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
47. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
48. Long, supra note 35, at 565. TRIPS was not self-executing in the United States, and
required further action from Congress and the President before it went into action. See id. The
URAA became effective in January 1995 via congressionally-authorized proclamation by
President Clinton. Proclamation No. 6763, 60 Fed. Reg. 1,007 (Dec. 23, 1994), modified by
Proclamation No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,845 (Mar. 23, 1995).
49. Patterson, supra note 15, at 408.
50. Long, supra note 35, at 565-66; Patterson, supra note 15, at 408.
51. Patterson, supra note 15, at 408. One small exception was the following: "[i]mportation
into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of
the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords ...." Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-553, § 602, 90 Stat. 2541, 2588 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2000)). Use of
this section was limited because Congress restricted its application to pirated or counterfeited
albums imported into the United States, not actual bootlegging. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAw 533-34 (3d ed. 1994).
52. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2004); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973)
(concluding that the term "Writings" generally includes "any physical rendering of the fruits of
creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.").
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). The criminal anti-bootlegging statute at issue in Martignon
has a sister provision which establishes civil liability for bootlegging. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4974 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101
(2000)). "Besides the difference in penalties, the only substantive differences are that § 2319A
also requires that the infringer 'knowingly' made an unauthorized recording and did so 'for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain."' Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int'l
Prods., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (C.D. Cal. 2004). See generally Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the
Copyright Act? Resolving the Uncertainties of the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ErT. L.J. 567 (1998) (explaining in detail the intricacies of § 1101).
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years ....
Conviction under § 2319A also requires the mandatory forfeiture
and destruction of any bootlegs, and gives the court discretionary power
to seize and destroy any equipment owned by the defendant by which
bootlegs could be made. 5' Thus, congressional enactment of the URAA
and section 513, and the subsequent codification at 18 U.S.C. § 2319,
was designed to fulfill the United States' TRIPS obligations concerning
bootlegging. 56 Because this legislation provided the first semblance of
copyright protection to live music, § 2319A at the very least suggested
that the "Golden Age" 57 of bootlegging in the United States could be
nearing its end.
C. The First Case to Challenge § 2319A: United
States v. Moghadam
Prior to United States v. Martignon, the only case to challenge the
constitutionality of § 2319A was United States v. Moghadam,5 8 an Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided in 1999. Ali Moghadam was
convicted under the anti-bootlegging statute in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida for distributing unauthorized
CDs featuring live performances by Tori Amos and the Beastie Boys.59
On appeal, he argued that § 2319A was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the "fixation concept" of the Copyright Clause by extending copy-
right protection to unfixed live performances.6 ° Moghadam contended
that, notwithstanding a bootlegger's decision to record it, a live perform-
ance is "fleeting and evanescent" and § 2319A impermissibly protects
such material.6 The government maintained that the anti-bootlegging
statute was constitutionally sustainable under both the Copyright Clause
and the Commerce Clause.62
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000) (providing further that repeat offenders can be imprisoned
for not more than 10 years or fined or both).
55. Id. § 2319A(b).
56. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
57. Hoffman, supra note 17, at 22.
58. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). Although many of the arguments that the court
employed in Moghadam are subject to debate, in this article only a narrative account is necessary
in order to give perspective on the state of the law leading up to Martignon. However, in
analyzing Martignon, some of these arguments will be addressed in comparing the two cases.
59. Id. at 1271.
60. Id. at 1274. Note that Ali Moghadam chose to challenge § 2319A solely on fixation
grounds, and not because the statute might circumvent the "duration" requirement as well. See
supra note 10.
61. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
62. Id. at 1271.
2005]
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1. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 2319A UNDER THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Moghadam assumed, without
deciding, that § 2319A was invalid under the Copyright Clause. 63 The
court explained that "[t]he concept of fixation suggests that works are
not copyrightable unless reduced to some tangible form," and live per-
formances "are merely capable of being reduced to tangible form, but
have not been."'  However, the court did not rule on whether copyright
protection for live music squares with the Copyright Clause, and instead
choose to analyze and uphold the anti-bootlegging statute under the
Commerce Clause.65
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 2319A UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the legislative authority to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states. 66 Pursu-
ant to this power, Congress can legislate within three categories: (1) to
regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) to protect the
instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate commerce; and (3) to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.67
Because a conviction under § 2319A does not require that the bootlegs
cross state or national borders, the court's analysis was confined solely
to the third category mentioned above.68 Therefore, in order for the reg-
ulation of purely intrastate commerce under § 2319A to be valid, the
court needed to find a rational basis for concluding that intrastate boot-
legging substantially affects interstate commerce. 69 The Moghadam
court asserted that "[t]o survive Commerce Clause scrutiny, § 2319A
'must bear more than a generic relationship several steps removed from
interstate commerce, and it must be a relationship that is apparent, not
creatively inferred.' ,7o Despite an absence of economic data regarding
the effect of bootlegging on interstate or foreign commerce,71 the court
63. Id. at 1274 ("For purposes of this case, we assume arguendo, without deciding, that the
... fixation requirement would preclude the use of the Copyright Clause as a source of
Congressional power for the anti-bootlegging statute.").
64. Id. at 1273-74.
65. Id. at 1282.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (articulating the Supreme Court's
current approach to Commerce Clause analysis).
68. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275.
69. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
70. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270
( lIth Cir. 1997)).
71. Id. As Congress was under the assumption it was acting under the Copyright Clause,
there are no legislative findings regarding the effect of bootlegged live musical performances on
interstate or foreign commerce. However, Congress's failure to cite the Commerce Clause does
not invalidate § 2319A. See, e.g., Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("The
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concluded that "[s]ection 2319A clearly prohibits conduct that has a sub-
stantial effect on both commerce between the several states and com-
merce with foreign nations. 'T The court was persuaded by the fact that,
since § 2319A requires that the bootlegging is done "for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain,"73 the offense "necessa-
rily is intertwined with commerce."74 Moreover, the court relied on the
circular assertion that Congress criminalized bootlegging precisely
because of its adverse economic effect on the legitimate music indus-
try.75 Finding that bootleg sales substantially affect interstate and for-
eign commerce, the court held that the anti-bootlegging statute met the
Supreme Court's current standard for permissible Commerce Clause
legislation.76
III. MOGHADAM UPHOLDS § 2319A PURSUANT TO THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE DESPITE THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
Once the Moghadam court found a sufficient link between bootleg-
ging and interstate commerce, it then had to address whether Congress
could enact § 2319A under the Commerce Clause, given the court's ear-
lier assumption that the Copyright Clause prohibits protection of unfixed
works.7 7 The court acknowledged the uncertainty created by two con-
flicting lines of Supreme Court precedent as to whether legislation fail-
ing the requirements of one grant of congressional power under the
Constitution could nevertheless be upheld under another such grant.78 A
similar issue was confronted in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise."); Timmer v. Mich. Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 839
(6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that in exercising the power of judicial review, the court examines only
the actual powers of the federal government).
72. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000).
74. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276.
75. Id. ("The very reason Congress prohibited this conduct is because of the deleterious
economic effect on the recording industry."). This position was supported throughout an amicus
brief submitted by the RIAA. Brief of Amicus Curiae Recording Industry Ass'n of Am., Inc. at 2-
6, United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2180). Furthermore, the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry estimates that sales of pirated recordings
can cost retailers over 30 percent of their business, with bootleg sales similarly affecting the sales
of legitimate records. Id. at 4. There is disagreement among several scholars as to the validity of
claims that bootlegging depresses the legitimate music market, because most bootleg buyers make
such purchases in addition to, and not instead of, authorized recordings. See, e.g., Maynor, supra
note 16, at 175; Lee H. Rousso, The Criminalization of Bootlegging: Unnecessary and Unwise, 1
BUFF. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 169 (2002).
76. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1279.
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States,79 whereby the Supreme Court held that even though the public
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were beyond
the scope of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the provisions possessed sufficient connection to interstate
commerce to sustain the Act under the Commerce Clause.80 Thus, the
reasoning in Heart of Atlanta and other decisions in this line of cases8'
"illustrates that, as a general matter, the fact that legislation reaches
beyond the limits of one grant of legislative power has no bearing on
whether it can be sustained under another."82
However, the Moghadam court also acknowledged83 the conflicting
Supreme Court precedent of Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gib-
bons.84 In Gibbons, a statute that directly conflicted with the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause85 was deemed unconstitutional
despite its validity under the Commerce Clause.86 Thus, Gibbons indi-
cates that some constitutional grants of power contain limitations that
Congress cannot evade by relying on alternate constitutional authority.87
As the Supreme Court in Gibbons explained: "if we were to hold that
Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant
to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a
limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws."88
In ruling on the constitutionality of § 2319A, the court in
Moghadam was faced with these two lines of precedents that, on the one
hand suggested that the Commerce Clause might be used by Congress to
uphold something impermissible under the Copyright Clause, and on the
other declared that some constitutional limitations °cannot be circum-
vented by resorting to an alternative grant of power. The court chose to
resolve this tension by following the Heart of Atlanta line of cases, care-
fully crafting a narrow holding that distinguished Moghadam from Gib-
79. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
80. Id. at 250.
81. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that pursuant to the
Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, Congress may condition its appropriation of money
to the states on their agreement to impose restrictions that would be beyond Congress's
constitutional legislative authority to enact directly); Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790
F.2d 220, 224 (2nd Cir. 1986) (suggesting that the Commerce Clause provides plenary authority,
allowing it to accomplish that which the Copyright Clause may not).
82. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277.
83. Id. at 1279.
84. Id.
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress is empowered to pass uniform
bankruptcy laws).
86. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
87. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279.
88. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468-69.
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bons.89 This holding was founded on the court's assumption that
Congress can contravene one grant of power when doing so is not funda-
mentally inconsistent with the text of the grant, and the action is permis-
sible under another clause.9" According to the court, "[c]ommon sense
does not indicate that extending copyright-like protection to a live per-
formance is fundamentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause."'"
First, the court reasoned that the Copyright Clause is a positive grant of
power rather than a limit on Congress's authority under other grants of
power, so that extending quasi-copyright protection under the Com-
merce Clause is not inconsistent with the Copyright Clause.92 Further-
more, the Moghadam court found that extending copyright protection to
unfixed works promotes the progress of the useful arts, in accord with
the purpose of the Copyright Clause.93 Finally, the court reasoned that
fixation is "something less than a rigid, inflexible barrier to Congres-
sional power." '94  Through this analysis, the court distinguished
§ 2319A's constitutional consistency from that of the statute at issue in
Gibbons, where the nonuniform bankruptcy statute at issue was wholly
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Clause. 95 Thus, Moghadam preferred
a case-by-case approach whereby statutes that contravene one grant of
legislative power but accord with another are measured by whether they
are "fundamentally inconsistent" with the former, an approach that ulti-
mately upheld the federal anti-bootlegging statute and rejected
Moghadam's constitutional challenge to it.
96
D. Moghadam: A Narrow Holding
Before attempting an analysis of United States v. Martignon, it is
important to note that the holding in Moghadam was relatively narrow.
Most importantly, the court did not officially rule on the key issue of
whether § 2319A is unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause-it
89. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1281.
92. Id. at 1280.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis added)).
94. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281. The court was persuaded by the definition of "fixed"
found in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which allows fixation to occur simultaneously with the work's
transmission and permits live performers to "fix" works while performing them. Id. at 1280-81.
The court reasoned that this allowance was evidence that the fixation requirement had become a
mere formality, rendering § 2319A's extension of protection to unfixed works fundamentally
consistent with the Copyright Clause. See id.
95. Id. at 1281.
96. Id. at 1282.
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merely assumed so. 97 Moreover, in upholding this legislation under the
Commerce Clause, the court was very careful to limit its holding to
Moghadam's fixation challenge, and specifically declined to decide
"whether extending copyright-like protection under the anti-bootlegging
statute might be fundamentally inconsistent with the '[1]imited Times'
requirement of the Copyright Clause . . . ."' The court's language
strongly suggests that, had § 2319A's seemingly perpetual protection
been challenged, it would have rendered the statute fundamentally
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause and, hence, unconstitutional.99
Rather, the Moghadam court decided to "reserve [that] issue[ ] for
another day' while foreseeing a future case that would challenge the
perpetual protection of § 2319A. l '0
III. UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON
A. Is § 2319A Copyright or Commercial Legislation?
When Jean Martignon challenged the constitutionality of § 2319A
on both fixation and duration grounds, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York was faced with the broader chal-
lenge envisioned by both the Moghadam court and scholars
1
1
2 alike. 10 3
Initially, the court set out to determine whether the anti-bootlegging stat-
ute was "copyright-like" or merely commercial legislation, finding it
"essential to determine how to classify a statute in order to ensure that it
does not run afoul of any express limitations imposed on Congress when
regulating in the respective arena."' 4 The court found unequivocally
that the anti-bootlegging statute was a copyright statute based on its lan-
guage, history, and placement within the United States Code.'0 5 By
penalizing those who profit from live music "without the consent of the
97. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
98. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
99. See id. See generally Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560-61 (2003) (suggesting
that a copyright of unlimited duration would tend to inhibit the progress of the arts); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that while extensions of protection are permissible, truly
perpetual copyright protection is unconstitutional).
100. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
101. See id. at 1281.
102. See, e.g., Keith V. Lee, Resolving the Dissonant Constitutional Chords Inherent in the
Federal Anti-Bootlegging Statute in United States v. Moghadam, 7 VILL. SPORTS & Er. L.J. 327,
362 (2000) ("The Eleventh Circuit cleverly composed a decision that avoided tortuous legal
brambles to a finale amenable to both sides. The next court to decide a similar issue may be
unable to, and given the appropriate facts, may be forced to re-interpret the Copyright Clause for
the twenty-first century.").
103. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
104. Id. at 420; accord Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 467 (1982)
(utilizing the "classification" method that the Martignon court employed as a starting point).
105. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22.
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performer,"' 6 § 2319A protects artists, rather than commerce, within
the purview of the Copyright Clause. 107 Moreover, importance was
placed on the fact that legislative materials0 8 explaining the purpose of
§ 2319A included no discussion of commerce, but instead articulated its
aim as the protection of performers.' 0 9 Furthermore, the court was con-
vinced that the anti-bootlegging statute was copyright legislation
because Congress placed it in the United States Code "almost as a subset
of the Copyright Act."110 Martignon declared that just because § 2319A
originated from an inter-country agreement whose purpose was "to
'ensure uniform recognition and treatment of intellectual property in
international commerce,' does not mean that each ... country's legisla-
tion has the same purpose domestically." '111 Finally, the court asserted
that even if Moghadam's findings that bootlegging substantially affects
commerce 112 are correct, such commercial consequences do not shift
§ 2319A's identity from copyright to commercial legislation."
13
B. Is § 2319A Constitutional Under the Copyright Clause?
Whereas the Moghadam court simply assumed that the anti-boot-
legging statute was not sustainable under the Copyright Clause," 4 Mar-
tignon confronted the issue head on.' 15 Not surprisingly, Martignon
confirmed Moghadam's assumptions, declaring § 2319A unconstitu-
tional under the Copyright Clause for contravening both its fixation and
duration requirements." 6 While Moghadam assumed that § 2319A vio-
lated the fixation requirement,1 7 Martignon held unambiguously that
unauthorized recordings of live musical performances are not "Writings"
because they are unfixed and, therefore, are not entitled to copyright
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
107. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21.
108. S. REP. No. 103-412, at 225 (1994) ("[The United States' obligation under TRIPS is] to
allow performers to prevent the unauthorized fixation in sound recordings or music videos of their
live performances and to prevent the reproduction of such recordings.").
109. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22.
110. Id. at 421. Furthermore, "rather than defining crucial terms, such as 'fixed,' 'musical
work,' and 'sound recordings,"' the anti-bootlegging statute "adopts the definitions of these terms
as stated in Title 17-the Copyright Title." Id. at 422.
111. Id. at 421 (quoting United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (1 1th Cir. 1999)).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
113. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
114. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
115. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 420 ("If the anti-bootlegging statute is a copyright-like
statute, as this Court finds that it is, it will be necessary to determine whether the statute falls
within Congress' power to legislate in that field.").
116. Id. at 422-23. As evidence of just how uncontroversial this point of law was, not even the
government argued that Congress had the authority to enact § 2319A under its Copyright Clause
powers alone. Id. at 422.
117. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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protection. 18
Unlike the defendant in Moghadam, Jean Martignon raised the
duration argument as a second attack on § 2319A's constitutionality." 9
In response, the Martignon court decisively held that § 2319A's grant of
"seemingly perpetual protection" impermissibly conflicts with the text
and purpose of the Copyright Clause.120 Not long before the Martignon
decision was rendered, the Supreme Court held that the "limited Times"
restriction in the Copyright Clause prevents Congress from granting
everlasting protection, but that protection for the "life of the author plus
70 years" is constitutionally acceptable.' 2' Therefore, while precisely
just how "limited" copyright protection must be to pass constitutional
muster is debatable, it is clear that perpetual protection violates any fair
reading of the duration requirement. 12 2 Additionally, the Martignon
court bolstered its argument by noting that the grant of perpetual protec-
tion in § 2319A frustrates the balance between authors' and the public's
interests that the duration limitation is meant to achieve. 123 Instead of
providing for eventual, and unfettered, access to the public, the anti-
bootlegging statute creates a monopoly whereby protected works never
reach the public domain. 124 Thus, Martignon held that § 2319A's grant
of perpetual protection to unfixed works renders the statute unconstitu-
tional under the Copyright Clause's duration and fixation limitations.' 25
C. Martignon Denies a Resort to Commerce Clause Authority After
Holding § 2319A Unconstitutional Under the Copyright Clause
The fact that Martignon found § 2319A unconstitutional under the
Copyright Clause was not entirely surprising, in part because Moghadam
had assumed this much five years earlier.' 26 However, Martignon sig-
naled a new direction in copyright law by departing from the approach
Moghadam employed to resolve the tension between the Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause. When faced with the two somewhat
118. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24.
119. Id. at 416-17.
120. Id. at 424.
121. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (ruling on the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act).
122. See id.; Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
123. Martignon, 346 F. Supp 2d at 424; accord Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326
U.S. 249, 255-56 (1945) ("[Tlhe means adopted by Congress of promoting the progress of science
and the arts is the limited grant of the patent monopoly in return for the full disclosure of the
patented invention and its dedication to the public upon the expiration of the patent.").
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).
125. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 423 ("[It runs doubly afoul of Congress' authority to
regulate under the Copyright Clause.").
126. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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divergent lines of Supreme Court precedent dealing with the interplay of
congressional powers across multiple provisions of the Constitution,1
7
the Moghadam court followed the line of cases exemplified by Heart of
Atlanta Motel128 to find § 2319A sustainable under the Commerce
Clause. 29 In contrast, the Martignon court found Gibbons3 ° more
applicable in weighing the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging stat-
ute.' In Gibbons, the Supreme Court explained that the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause 32 is an affirmative limitation on
congressional power that Congress cannot bypass or evade by resorting
to the Commerce Clause.' 33 The Martignon court reasoned that just as
the Bankruptcy Clause imposes the affirmative restriction of uniformity,
the Copyright Clause imposes the affirmative restrictions of fixation and
duration.'34 In the same way that Congress could not bypass affirmative
limitations in the Bankruptcy Clause by resorting to the Commerce
Clause, the court held it was also impermissible to do so with respect to
the Copyright Clause. 135 Specifically, the court held:
In order to give meaning to the express limitations provided in the
Copyright Clause, when enacting copyright-like legislation, such as
the anti-bootlegging statute ... Congress may not, if the Copyright
Clause does not allow for such legislation, enact the law under a sep-
arate grant of power, even when that separate grant provides proper
authority. 1
36
In this respect, the Martignon decision is in line with the reasoning of
Gibbons: If Congress can circumvent express li mitations found in the
Constitution, entire provisions therein could be rendered meaningless.' 37
In justifying its reliance on the Gibbons case rather than Heart of
Atlanta, Martignon contrasted the nature of the Copyright and Bank-
127. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
128. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
129. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11 th Cir. 1999). The Court analogized
the Copyright Clause to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that, just as Congress could use the
Commerce Clause to legislate beyond the reach of § 5 by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
they could also go beyond the Copyright Clause to enact § 2319A under Commerce Clause
powers. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
130. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
131. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The similarities
between [Gibbons] and this case are obvious.").
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws).
133. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69.
134. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 424-25.
137. Gibbons , 455 U.S. at 468-69 ("[I]f we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact
nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.").
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ruptcy Clauses with that of the Fourteenth Amendment at issue in Heart
of Atlanta.138 Martignon declared that while the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the power to prohibit discrimination, 139 it is devoid of
any affirmative limitations. 4 ° Therefore, when legislating pursuant to
this mandate, Congress is not directly constrained by any limitations
within the Fourteenth Amendment and is empowered to enact legislation
supported by other grants of power within the Constitution. 4' Because
the Copyright Clause does contain affirmative limitations, Congress's
freedom to enact copyright legislation is not analogous to its power to
prohibit discrimination.' 42 Thus, the Martignon decision distinguishes
the Gibbons and Heart of Atlanta precedents, with the former applying
to grants of power that include affirmative limitations, and the latter to
grants without such limitations. " 3 Accordingly, Martignon denied any
attempt to sustain § 2319A under the Commerce Clause after finding
that it failed to satisfy the affirmative Copyright Clause limitations."4
IV. MARTIGNON'S DOCTRINAL DEPARTURE FROM MOGHADAM WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
When the Eleventh Circuit handed down United States v.
Moghadam in 1999, its critics were wary that it might signal the extinc-
tion of copyright law, 1 5 and even its supporters were skeptical of the
court's reasoning. 46 However, most commentators acknowledged that
the decision rested on uncertain legal footing, and that courts might han-
138. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 426-28 n.19.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
140. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428 n.19.
141. Id. ("The Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Copyright Clause, is solely an affirmative
grant of power - without any express limitations. Therefore, when enacting legislation to prohibit
discrimination, Congress need not look solely to the Fourteenth Amendment, but may utilize other
grants of power to achieve such an end.").
142. See id.
143. See id. at 426-28.
144. See id.
145. E.g., Joseph C. Merschman, Note, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause:
Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress's Copyright Power, 34 CoNN.
L. REv. 661, 662-63 ("If Congress can avoid pesky limitations on its copyright power simply by
waiving the banner of interstate commerce, the result would be complete decimation of our system
of copyright."); David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1412 (1995)
(asserting that copyright law may already be irrelevant because it has been transformed from a
mechanism intended to promote progress in the science and arts into an instrumentality Congress
can use for other goals).
146. E.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 272, 287 (2004) (noting that the opinion avoids the key issue concerning the constitutionality
of intellectual property legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and criticizing the
decision for being "just a little too pat").
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dle the issues differently in the future.' 47 This consensus regarding
Moghadam's uncertain future was validated five years later by
Martignon.
Martignon wisely confronted and decided the important copyright
issues that Moghadam's analysis avoided five years earlier. Moreover,
Martignon correctly departed from Moghadam's flawed reasoning in
regard to the interplay of overlapping constitutional provisions, and
instead employed an approach that is more faithful to a fair reading of
the Constitution. 14 8 However, without direct Supreme Court case law to
settle § 2319A's constitutional validity, it is useful to critically examine
the differences in the two cases.
A. Copyright Laws That Fail To Comply with the Duration
Limitation Are Unconstitutional: Martignon and Moghadam Agree
First, it is undeniable that, just as Jean Martignon successfully chal-
lenged the anti-bootlegging statute on both fixation and duration
grounds, the Moghadam court also would have struck down § 2319A
had it been faced with the same, dual challenge. While the "fundamen-
tal inconsistency" approach taken in Moghadam was able to sustain the
statute against the fixation challenge, 149 the court expressed great doubt
as to whether § 2319A could survive a duration challenge under this
same standard.' 50  Indeed, the court expressly limited its fundamental
consistency-based holding to the fixation issue alone.151 Instead of con-
cluding the opinion after deciding the fixation challenge before it, the
147. E.g., Merschman, supra note 145, at 693 ("Eventually the Supreme Court will have to
decide the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute. When it does, it undoubtedly will
strike down the law as a violation of the Copyright Clause's fixation requirement, which cannot be
abrogated by Congress's commerce authority."); Nachbar, supra note 146, at 296-97; Lee, supra
note 102, at 362.
148. See Merschman, supra note 145, at 662-63 (asserting that, according to the basic tenets of
constitutional construction, the fixation requirement of the Copyright Clause must limit
Congress's other Article I powers as well); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (2000) (asserting that just as the Supreme Court has held that the Bankruptcy
Clause, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and Article m limit Congress's exercise of its
general legislative power, the Copyright Clause should be read to impose similar limits); William
Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1999) (declaring that copyright legislation should
be invalidated where Congress ignores the limits on its enumerated intellectual property powers);
Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Dastar Corp.
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (No. 02-428) (supporting the view, later
adopted in Martignon, that Copyright Clause restrictions apply to all Article I, Section 8
congressional powers).
149. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280-82 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supra
notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
150. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
151. Id. at 1281 n.14.
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Moghadam court went on to note that "[o]n its face, the protection cre-
ated by the anti-bootlegging statute is apparently perpetual and contains
no express time limit ... ,, "" Finally, Moghadam cites Goldstein v.
California'53 for the proposition that copyright of unlimited duration
would run counter to the goals of the Copyright Clause,'54 further sug-
gesting that § 2319A's perpetual protection would have rendered it "fun-
damentally inconsistent" with the purpose of the duration limitation.
Thus, as the Martignon court ruled,' 55 and the Moghadam court essen-
tially conceded,' 56 copyright legislation that grants perpetual protection
is unconstitutional. 57 Thus, the Martignon court would have held that
§ 2319A is unconstitutional for contravening the duration requirement
even if it had applied the Moghadam approach.
B. Copyright Laws That Contravene Any One of the Copyright
Clause's Affirmative Limitations Are Automatically Unconstitutional:
Martignon Agrees; Moghadam Does Not
Post-Martignon, the primary focus should be on whether the court's
approach, rather than its final result, is sound. If faced with similar chal-
lenges, both the Moghadam and Martignon courts would have found
§ 2319A unconstitutional as violative of the duration limitation. How-
ever, the differences between the courts' approaches are most recogniza-
ble in how the fixation challenges common to both cases were handled.
In Moghadam, the court held that although § 2319A protected unfixed
works in contravention of the Copyright Clause, the statute was nonethe-
less constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it was not funda-
mentally inconsistent with the Copyright Clause.158 In Martignon, the
court's approach would have rendered the anti-bootlegging statute
unconstitutional, even in the face of a fixation challenge alone.' 59 This
different treatment of the fixation requirement shows that, while both the
Martignon and Moghadam approaches would correctly lead to the inval-
idation of a copyright statute providing perpetual protection, their differ-
152. Id. at 1281.
153. 412 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1973).
154. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
155. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
156. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
157. This conclusion is not very controversial given the dearth of legal authority supporting a
copyright regime that prevents works from ever reaching the public domain. Any argument that
supports perpetual copyright protection would be even harder to sustain legally, given the recent
Supreme Court case holding that the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the duration
requirement of the Copyright Clause because it did not create perpetual copyrights. See Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209-10 (2003).
158. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1280.
159. See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25.
[Vol. 60:131
UNITED STATES V. MARTIGNON
ent treatment of the fixation requirement leads to very different
conclusions when other Copyright Clause limitations are contravened. 
160
C. The Martignon Approach Is More Consistent with
the Constitution
Martignon not only reached the correct result, but also laid forth an
approach that invariably leads to the proper result when examining legis-
lative attempts at Copyright Clause circumvention. The approach taken
in Martignon is in harmony with the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion and is true to its ideals of a federal government limited to the pow-
ers enumerated therein.161 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
scholars agree with Martignon's central premise that Congress is bound
by the Copyright Clause's limitations and therefore cannot avoid them
by resorting to the Commerce Clause when enacting copyright laws.
162
Included in the majority who support the Martignon approach are
Professors Heald and Sherry, who analogize inter-clause conflicts to the
Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.163 With respect to
the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has routinely held that the
real check on the federal government's usurpation of state powers is not
the text of the Tenth Amendment, "but rather a combination of the sys-
tem of dual sovereignty established by the Constitution and the nature of
the federal government as a government of enumerated powers."
' 164
Heald and Sherry argue that the Framers would not have carefully estab-
lished a federal system if state power could be so easily intruded
upon.165 These same structural considerations lead to the conclusion
that the Copyright Clause limits Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, since it is unlikely that the Framers would have included super-
fluous limitations in the Copyright Clause that could be so easily cir-
cumvented through reliance on the Commerce Clause.1
66
160. By "other" Copyright Clause limitations, I am referring to the fixation and originality
requirements.
161. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
162. Nachbar, supra note 146, at 274 ("The prevailing wisdom is that the limits in the
[Copyright] Clause, for instance that exclusive rights be granted only to 'Writings' and
'Discoveries' or that they be for 'limited Times,' must be read as applying to all of Congress's
powers ...."). However, Professor Nachbar does not subscribe to this view, and his article aims
to dispel this "prevailing wisdom." Id. at 276.
163. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 148, at 1123-24.
164. Nachbar, supra note 146, at 288.
165. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 148, at 1138.
166. See Patry, supra note 148, at 374 (arguing that restrictions in one clause of the
Constitution must be taken into account when congressional power under a different clause is
analyzed). But see Nachbar, supra note 146, at 291-92 (arguing that the limits in the Copyright
Clause were not the result of great deliberation by the Framers and are insignificant compared to
the Tenth Amendment's maintenance of state sovereignty).
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Furthermore, Martignon is consistent with prevailing characteriza-
tion of the Constitution as "an organic scheme of government to be dealt
with as an entirety,"' 67 and with the view of scholars who focus on the
fact that the Copyright Clause imposes affirmative limitations on con-
gressional power. 16  Significantly, Martignon aligned with Gibbons
instead of Heart of Atlanta Motel based on the finding that the Copy-
right Clause contains affirmative limitations and is not simply a positive
grant of power.169 If the Constitution is to be read as a whole, as Lau-
rence Tribe suggests, Congress must abide by such affirmative limita-
tions found within the enumerated powers at all times, including when
legislating pursuant to another grant of power. 170 When affirmative lim-
itations are not heeded, and congressional circumvention is permitted,
entire provisions can be rendered meaningless. The Martignon approach
prevents such constitutional sidestepping.
D. The Current Supreme Court Would Likely Agree with Martignon
The United States has appealed the Martignon decision to the
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals."' If Martignon is
affirmed, there will be a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit's
Moghadam ruling, and therefore, an increased likelihood that the
Supreme Court will grant certiorari to evaluate § 2319A's constitution-
ality. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court would
resolve a Moghadam-Martignon split in favor of Martignon.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 172 is one
167. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 44 (1957). Despite the fact that Martignon is consistent with
prevailing constitutional norms, there is legal scholarship espousing more functionalist approaches
to the Consitution, and suggesting that Martignon is incorrect. See Nachbar, supra note 146, at
276 (arguing that not all of the limits on Article I powers are of equal constitutional weight, and
that one must consider the significance of the constitutional restriction before applying it
indiscriminately); Lee, supra note 102, at 361-62 (praising Moghadam for reaching a decision in
line with public policy); Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-
Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 457, 460 (2003) (favoring a case-by-case approach of "judicial
weighing of the rival purposive goals [of the two clauses]" when a conflict exists).
168. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 148, at 1124; Merschman, supra note 145, at 692.
169. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. As Merschman observed, "Heart of
Atlanta Motel is a case where the Court found that 'Congress's power just runs out, rather than
runs into barriers,' whereas Moghadam involved [such] barriers .... Merschman, supra note
145, at 685 (quoting Heald and Sherry, supra note 148, at 1124). Obviously, this statement can be
applied to Martignon as well, given that Moghadam dealt with the same statute and clauses of the
Constitution.
170. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1249 (1995) ("[E]ach of the
Constitution's numerous grants of power must be interpreted in light of the others.").
171. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(1:03CR01287).
172. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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highly relevant Supreme Court decision that might impact the Court's
decision on the constitutionality of § 2319A. In Feist, Rural Telephone
Service Company initiated a copyright infringement action against Feist
Publications for publishing a phone book using Rural's local white
pages listings.' 7 3 The Supreme Court held that Rural's listings were not
subject to copyright protection because they did not satisfy the Copy-
right Clause's originality requirement.174 Like the fixation requirement,
the originality requirement is not expressly stated in the Copyright
Clause, but has been implied from the terms "Authors" and "Writ-
ings."' 75 Therefore, the Supreme Court's attribution of serious weight to
the Copyright Clause's originality requirement indicates that the fixation
requirement might be equally weighted in evaluating § 2319A. 176 Feist
acknowledged that while the phone-book publisher did appropriate the
results of an enormous amount of effort and information from the phone
utility, such free-riding is not copyright infringement where the original-
ity limitation prevents copyright protection from attaching in the first
place. 177 By way of analogy, in the context of bootlegging, although
recording live music at a concert may appropriate the fruits of perform-
ers' labor, it does not constitute copyright infringement where the music
is never fixed and, thus, never protected. In sum, the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Copyright Clause's originality limitation in Feist sug-
gests that the Supreme Court will not allow circumvention of the Copy-
right Clause's originality, fixation, or duration requirements, thereby
negating any need for Commerce Clause analysis.
Even if the Supreme Court were to reach a Commerce Clause anal-
ysis of § 2319A, its recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests
that it might still invalidate the anti-bootlegging statute. 78 For decades,
the Supreme Court had shown great deference to Congress's commerce
power. 179 However, in United States v. Lopez the Court struck down the
Gun-Free School Zone Act, holding that the statute exceeded Congress's
commerce authority by regulating economic activity that did not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.1 80 This modem, more restrictive
173. Id. at 342-44.
174. Id. at 364.
175. Id. at 346.
176. See id. at 351 ("[O]riginality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright
protection."); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (attributing serious weight to the
Copyright Clause's "limited Times" requirement).
177. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
178. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
179. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
180. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.
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approach by the Supreme Court suggests that it would, at the very least,
closely examine whether bootlegging "substantially affects" interstate
commerce.' 81 Consequently, it is doubtful that the Moghadam approach
of simply inferring a substantial relationship between bootlegging and
interstate commerce would pass muster under the Supreme Court's more
demanding Commerce Clause standard post-Lopez.' Therefore, even
if the Supreme Court reaches the Commerce Clause analysis, its recent
decisions suggest that the Court would not be as deferential as the
Moghadam court.
E. Martignon Signals a Trend
In KISS Catalog v. Passport International Products'83 a California
district court decided the first case since Martignon and addressed the
federal criminalization of bootlegging. The KISS court faced the same
dual constitutional challenge on fixation and duration grounds, but the
statute at issue was 17 U.S.C. § 1101 - the civil equivalent of
§ 2319A.184 The court held the anti-bootlegging statute unconstitu-
tional, echoing Martignon's reliance on Gibbons, and forbidding con-
gressional circumvention of affirmative constitutional limitations.' In
further repudiating Moghadam, the California court expressed its inabil-
ity to reconcile Moghadam's "fundamentally inconsistent" test with
Gibbons.186
It is important to note that the California district court could have
chosen to follow either Martignon or Moghadam to reach its conclusion
that the anti-bootlegging statute was unconstitutional. Martignon would
have invalidated § 1101 for violating the Copyright Clause's fixation
and duration limitations, while Moghadam would have found the perpet-
ual protection provided by the statute "fundamentally inconsistent" with
the Constitution. However, this district court was persuaded by Mar-
tignon's reasoning, reaching its conclusion on essentially the same
grounds.' 87 California's holding suggests that Martignon's importance
may be as a trailblazing case in this realm of copyright jurisprudence.
Furthermore, if additional jurisdictions decide to follow Martignon, a
181. Given that the anti-bootlegging statute has no requirement that the bootlegs cross state
borders, § 2319A can only be sustained if it substantially affects interstate commerce. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
183. 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
184. Id. at 825.
185. Id. at 836-37.
186. Id. at 837 n.ll.
187. Id. at 836-37.
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circuit split with Moghadam could arise regardless of the outcome of
Martignon's pending appeal in the Second Circuit.
F. Final Thoughts
If Martignon and KISS Records are correct, and higher courts agree
that § 2319A is unconstitutional, the important issue then becomes what
options Congress has if it wants to continue criminalizing bootleg-
ging.188 At the very least, Martignon requires that an anti-bootlegging
statute, like all copyright laws, include a time-limit on the protection it
provides authors. ' 89 Furthermore, a revised version of § 2319A would
comply with the fixation requirement if it extended protection only to
works that are performed and fixed simultaneously.' 90 Individuals could
then prevent the bootlegging of their live music by taking simple steps
to record while performing. 191
Any legislation prohibiting bootlegging might also pass the test of
constitutionality by congressional indication in the language, history,
and placement of the statute that it is commercial, rather than copyright,
legislation. The Martignon court placed importance on first classifying
the anti-bootlegging statute as a copyright-like law before subjecting it
to the Copyright Clause limitations. 192 It might be possible for Congress
to draft an anti-bootlegging statute that embodies an overarching com-
mercial purpose, and is not copyright-like in nature. Such a statute
would be subject only to the much broader limits of the Commerce
Clause, and shielded from copyright analysis altogether.' 93
Clearly, Martignon's holding does not leave Congress impotent
188. There is disagreement over whether bootlegging, as distinct from counterfeiting and
piracy, helps or harms the legitimate music industry, and therefore the necessity of another
attempt at legislation is unclear. See, e.g., Lee H. Rousso, supra note 75; Maynor, supra note 16.
189. United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280-81 (11th
Cir. 1999).
191. Critics of Martignon could argue that, if the fixation requirement is so easy to circumvent,
then clearly it should not be considered as mandatory as other Copyright Clause requirements.
However, this view is not supported by any precedent, as courts have always required some form
of fixation. The fact that the term "Writings" has been interpreted increasingly broadly does not
warrant the leap that fixation is completely unnecessary. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 561 (1973) (holding that, while "[W]ritings" has come to include much more than its literal
meaning, it has not been expanded beyond a "physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor").
192. See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 419-22.
193. This possibility reveals the biggest flaw with the Martignon approach. While § 2319A
unambiguously is a copyright statute, future statutes may be much harder to classify as either
commercial or copyright legislation. For these borderline cases, the Martignon approach does not
indicate how to proceed without first classifying the statute. However, the classification of a
statute is no harder or more ambiguous than employing the "fundamental consistency" test
provided in Moghadam.
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against the bootlegging of live music.19' Rather, Martignon merely reaf-
firms the traditional duration and fixation parameters of the Copyright
Clause, leaving it to Congress to either make the necessary changes to
§ 2319A or draft a new anti-bootlegging statute. However, as Mar-
tignon decided and Moghadam implied, the anti-bootlegging statute in
its current form is unconstitutional copyright legislation.
MICHAEL C. SHUE*
194. Indeed, if the Constitution forbids Congress from criminalizing bootlegging, U.S.
domestic law would be in serious conflict with the United States' international treaty obligations
found in the TRIPS agreement. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Therefore, changes
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